Young Education Professionals-DC & DCAB-L

kumar jadhav

Hey, folks! Nothin' Fancy is kicking off its 30th Anniversary Tour on Thursday, February 8th at Jammin' Java in Vienna. You should go. Yes, you. There are some tickets still available, go get 'em!

Thursday, Feb 8th, doors at 6pm, show at 7:30pm, all ages. Venue has a full kitchen and a bar, so make an evening of it! Gonna be a big time.

https://www.jamminjava.com/shows/nothin-fancy-30th-anniversary-tour/ for tix and info.

Cheers,

Brian

Read More :- "[dcab-l] Reminder - Nothin' Fancy at Jammin' Java Thu 2/8"

kumar jadhav

This project is a demonstration of advanced DLL hijack techniques. It was released in conjunction with the "Adaptive DLL Hijacking" blog post. I recommend you start there to contextualize this code.

This project is comprised of the following elements:

Harness.exe: The "victim" application which is vulnerable to hijacking (static/dynamic)
Functions.dll: The "real" library which exposes valid functionality to the harness
Theif.dll: The "evil" library which is attempting to gain execution
NetClone.exe: A C# application which will clone exports from one DLL to another
PyClone.py: A python 3 script which mimics NetClone functionality

The VS solution itself supports 4 build configurations which map to 4 different methods of proxying functionality. This should provide a nice scalable way of demonstrating more techniques in the future.

Stc-Forward: Forwards export names during the build process using linker comments
Dyn-NetClone: Clones the export table from functions.dll onto theif.dll post-build using NetClone
Dyn-PyClone: Clones the export table from functions.dll onto theif.dll post-build using PyClone
Dyn-Rebuild: Rebuilds the export table and patches linked import tables post-load to dynamically prepare for function proxying

The goal of each technique is to successfully capture code execution while proxying functionality to the legitimate DLL. Each technique is tested to ensure static and dynamic sink situations are handled. This is by far not every primitive or technique variation. The post above goes into more detail.

Example

Prepare a hijack scenario with an obviously incorrect DLL

> copy C:\windows\system32\whoami.exe .\whoami.exe
        1 file(s) copied.

> copy C:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll .\wkscli.dll
        1 file(s) copied.

Executing in the current configuration should result in an error

> whoami.exe 

"Entry Point Not Found"

Convert kernel32 to proxy functionality for wkscli

> NetClone.exe --target C:\windows\system32\kernel32.dll --reference C:\windows\system32\wkscli.dll --output wkscli.dll
[+] Done.

> whoami.exe
COMPUTER\User

Download Koppeling

http://www.slideshare.net/danielmiessler/iot-attack-surfaces-defcon-2015

There are huge differences between the following risks:

Attackers can directly communicate with the router (or camera) from the Internet without authentication and exploit the vulnerability. This is the worst-case scenario. For example, an automated ransomware attack against your NAS is pretty bad.
Attackers have to position themselves in the same WAN network (e.g. Sprint mobile network in the case of Jeep hacking) to exploit the vulnerability. This is still pretty bad.
The vulnerable code can not be triggered directly from the Internet, but tricks like CSRF can be used to exploit it (details later in this post).
The vulnerable code can not be triggered directly from the Internet, and it uses a protocol/port which prevents Cross Protocol Scripting. Attackers have to access the local network before exploiting this vulnerability.

As it is the case with the worst scenario, one can find a lot of devices connected to the internet. You can always find funny stuff at http://explorer.shodanhq.com/#/explore , or use the nmap screenshot script to find your own stuff :)

Network exposure

Most devices are behind an IPv4 NAT device (e.g. home router), thus can not be reached from the Internet side by default. Except when the device configures the firewall via UPNP. Or the device has a persistence cloud connection, and the cloud can send commands to the device. Or the device uses IPv6 tunneling (e.g. Teredo), thus it is reachable from the Internet. But not every vulnerability on your home network is accessible directly from the Internet. As more and more devices and networks will support IPv6, this scenario might change, but I hope most home routers will come with a default deny configuration in their IPv6 firewall module. On the other hand, scanning for IPv6 devices blindly is not feasible due to the large number of IPv6 addresses, but some tricks might work.

If attackers can not access the device directly, there is a way to hack it through the user's browser. Just convince the victim user to visit a website, and via CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery) and brute-forcing the device IP, it is possible to hack some devices (mostly through HTTP - if the exploit can fit into simple GET or POST commands.

If attackers can not attack the device vulnerability through the Internet directly, or via CSRF, but have connected to the same network - the network exposure shrinks significantly. And when attackers are on the same network as you, I bet you have bigger problems than the security of the IoT devices ...

Recommendations for home users

Don't buy **** you don't need

Disconnect from the power cord the IoT devices you don't need to operate 7*24.

Disable cloud connectivity if it is not necessary. For example, I have a NAS device that can be reached through the "cloud", but I have disabled it by not configuring any default gateway for the device. I prefer connecting to my network via VPN and reach all my stuff through that.

Prevent CSRF attacks. I use two tricks. Don't use the 192.168.0.x - 192.168.10.x network at-home - use an uncommon IP range instead (e.g. 192.168.156.x is better). The second trick is I configured my Adblock plugin in my primary browser to block access to my internal network. And I use another browser whenever I want to access my internal devices. Update: On Firefox you can use NoScript ABE to block access to internal resources.

Check your router configuration:

disable UPnP
check the firewall settings and disable unnecessary port forwards
check for IPv6 settings, and configure the firewall as default deny for incoming IPv6 TCP/UDP.

Change default passwords, especially for services connected to the Internet. Follow password best practices.

Run Nmap to locate new IoT in your home network :)

Run a WiFi scan to locate new WiFi access points. Let me share a personal experience with you. I moved to a new house and brought my own WiFi router with me. I plugged it in, and forget about WiFi. Months later it turned out I had two other WiFi devices in my house - the cable modem had its own integrated WiFi with default passwords printed on the bottom, and the Set-top-box was the same - default WiFi passwords printed on the bottom. And don't forget to scan for ZigBee, Bluetooth, IrDA, FM, ...

Update your devices - in case you have a lot of free time in your hand.

Don't allow your guests to connect to your home network. Set up a separated AP for them. Imagine your nephew stealing your private photos or videos from your NAS or DNLA server.

With great power, comes great responsibility. The less device you own in your house, the less time you need to maintain those.

Read the manuals of your devices. Be aware of the different interfaces. Configure it in a secure way.

Disable Teredo protocol in case you don't need IPv6.

Stop being amazed by junk hacking.

Update: Disable WebRTC: https://www.browserleaks.com/webrtc , in Chrome you can use this extension: https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/webrtc-network-limiter/npeicpdbkakmehahjeeohfdhnlpdklia

Update: Prevent against DNS rebind attacks via configuring a DNS server which can block internal IP addresses. OpenDNS can block internal IP, but this is not a default option, you have to configure it.

Recommendations for vendors

For vendors, I recommend at least the followings:

Implement security during Software Development LifeCycle
Continuous security testing and bug bounties
Seamless auto-update
Opt-in cloud connectivity

Recommendations for journalists

Stop FUD. Pretty please.

The questions to ask before losing your head

who can exploit the vulnerability?
what prerequisites do we have about the attack to successfully exploit the vulnerability? Is the attacker already in your home network? If yes, you have probably bigger problems.
what can the attacker do when the exploit is successful?

And last but not least, don't forget that in the case of IoT devices, sometimes users are the product, not the customer. IoT is about collecting data for marketing purposes.

http://blog.open-xchange.com/2015/02/09/iot/

Continue reading

Read More :- "How To Secure Your Home Against "Internet Of Things" And FUD"

Young Education Professionals-DC & DCAB-L

Tuesday, 30 January 2024

[dcab-l] Reminder - Nothin' Fancy at Jammin' Java Thu 2/8

Sunday, 28 January 2024

Koppeling - Adaptive DLL Hijacking / Dynamic Export Forwarding

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